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I. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
The company is a legal structure designed to bring together the
different parties of a firm—its employees, investors, customers, and
suppliers—in the delivery of its corporate purpose. Corporations were
established as institutions with autonomous lives—self-standing, legal
entities independent of those who worked, financed, and managed them.
They were devices to ensure long-term commitment to shared goals and
risks, with reciprocal obligations on those engaged in them. A company
had to declare its purpose before earning a licence to trade. For example,
the East India Company, England’s earliest public company, to issue
shares to the public as permanent capital, was given the monopoly for
English trade in Asia with reciprocal obligations to protect trade along its
*
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routes.1 There was a mutual relationship between the company and society
and a mutual benefit to both.2
This was carried through to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
with canal and railway companies operating under charter to deliver on a
public purpose. It was with freedom of incorporation in the middle of the
nineteenth century that the focus on public purpose gave way to private
interest. Nevertheless, public benefit remained at the heart of many private
companies, with the families who owned them, such as Cadbury and
Rowntree’s, having an interest in wider social purpose beyond pure
financial gain. However, to meet the needs for growth in industrial firms
in the twentieth century, equity was issued for internal investment and
acquisition that diluted these families to the point that they lost control of
their companies.3 Public markets provided capital that promoted economic
development and brought transparency to what were previously opaque
private firms. However, this came at a price in the separation of ownership
from the control of firms.
With the separation of ownership and control came a concern,
expressed most forcefully by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, about the need for
shareholders to reassert their authority over corporations to ensure that
they were run in the interest of their owners, not the self-interest of their
managers. The truth, largely forgotten, is that this argument was embedded
in a larger vision that wanted economic and political power, in all its
guises, to be exercised to benefit the community at large. This pluralist
frame of reference subsequently fell out of view, with consequences that
reverberate today.4 So was born what has become a preoccupation ever
since with the “agency problem” in the modern corporation of aligning the
interests of managers with those of their shareholders to avoid unprofitable
growth or undue complacency.
The common response has been the strengthening of shareholder
rights. As Figure 1 (see below) shows, there has been a marked increase
and convergence in investor protection in all major industrialised countries
over the past twenty years, regardless of their legal traditions or stage of
1. PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY & THE EARLY MODERN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 61–64 (2011).
2. Colin Mayer, Reinventing the Corporation, 4 J. BRIT. ACAD. 53, 59 (2015).
3. Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time with the Family: The
Decline of Family Ownership in the UK 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10628,
2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10628 [https://perma.cc/E7EA-6PWB].
4. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474 (2014); see also
Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal
Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 182 (2005).
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development. In some countries, such as China, Germany, and Sweden, it
has been very pronounced. In others, such as the U.K. and the U.S.,
shareholder protection was already well established at the beginning of the
1990s and has experienced only modest changes since.5
Figure 1: Shareholder Protection in Twin Countries
between 1990 and 2013

The above graph, from the Law, Finance, and Development project at
the University of Cambridge, presents an aggregate of ten
variables, which act as proxies for shareholder protection laws, for the
years 1990–2012. Each variable is scored between 0 and 10, with the
possibility of intermediate scores (0 = minimum, 10 = maximum strength
of protection), so the left-hand scale goes from 0 to 10. Variables include:
powers of the general meeting for de facto changes; agenda setting
power; anticipation of shareholder decision facilitated; prohibition of
multiple voting rights (super voting rights); independent board members;
feasibility of director’s dismissal; private enforcement of director’s
duties (derivative suit); shareholder action against resolutions of the
general meeting; mandatory bidding; and disclosure of major share
ownership.

The justification for the strengthening of shareholder rights is
twofold. In the context of dispersed ownership systems such as the U.K.
and the U.S., it provides a countervailing power to that of corporate
5. MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 235–36 (2014); Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems,
Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder Protection: Leximetric Evidence for 30 Countries,
1990–2013, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 127, 134 (2015).
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executives and managers who control corporate assets. Conversely, in
more concentrated ownership systems that are commonplace outside of
the U.K. and U.S., it gives minority investors protection against the
dominant shareholders who can exploit their power to the detriment of
other shareholders.
If equity markets are to operate efficiently as allocators of resources
and monitors of the use of capital, then minority shareholders as residual
claimants need to have the means of protecting themselves against both
management and dominant shareholders—a truth recognised in all
countries.6 Their rights, therefore, ensure that the policies and practices of
companies are consistent with value creation, not value diversion, for the
benefits of vested interests.7
There is no doubt that shareholder rights have been important in
avoiding the conflicts identified by Berle and Means some eighty years
ago. The question is whether they go far enough in protecting not only the
interests of minority shareholders but also the interests of all the other
parties who are critical to corporate success and are vulnerable to sectional
interests.
II. THE RIGHT BALANCE
Shareholder rights are not ends in themselves. In seeking to right the
wrong identified by Berle and Means, we have lost sight of its original
purpose. Owners are shareholders, but shareholders are not always
6. See Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10766, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10766.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JVTHRBT]; see also Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Funding Growth in Bank-based and
Market-based Financial Systems: Evidence from Firm-level Data, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 337, 341 (2002);
James R. Brown, Gustav Martinsson & Bruce C. Petersen, Law, Stock Markets, and Innovation, 68 J.
FIN. 1517, 1531 (2013) (for work that focuses on the financing of innovation).
7. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,
118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 125–26 (2003). The authors find that that well-governed firms beat poorly
governed firms by 8.5% per annum according to an index of shareholder rights. See John E. Core,
Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An
Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 655 (2006).
Given the influence of this paper, particularly in pioneering the use of corporate governance indices
in empirical work, it has given rise to substantial discussion. See id.; Shane A. Johnson, Theodore
Moorman & Sorin Sorescu, A Reexamination of Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 4753, 4773–74 (2009) (suggesting that market models used by the paper have been
misspecified); see also Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Corporate Governance, Product Market
Competition, and Equity Prices, 66 J. FIN. 563, 598 n.20 (2011) (for studies that address these concerns
and find that basic results still hold); Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate
Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1854 (2007) (identifying how takeover defences
destroy shareholder value); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1362–68 (2013) (for a legal perspective on how corporate governance indices
are used and misused in empirical work).
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owners. Owners are engaged shareholders. They are involved in the
oversight and sometimes the management of firms. They appoint the
executives and the board of companies and monitor their performance.
They may define the purpose of the company and assist the executive in
the delivery of it. If the executive fails, then they seek its replacement. In
particular, unlike disengaged shareholders, they accept responsibilities as
well as rights—responsibilities to ensure that the company delivers on its
purpose and to bear at least some of the consequences for its failure to do
so.
Shareholders are investors. They provide capital, they earn returns
from their investments, they receive reports on the performance of their
investments, and they sometimes cast votes at shareholder meetings. The
distinction between owners and shareholders is critical to understanding
the ability of companies to be able to define, uphold, and deliver on their
purpose. Disengaged shareholders have an interest in the financial
performance of the firm, but no more. The purpose of the corporation,
from their perspective, is to generate as large a financial return as possible,
with little consideration as to how it is done.
From the perspective of the disengaged shareholder, corporate
purpose appears, at best, a little more than branding gloss and, at worst, an
active impediment. An obligation to a purpose risks shackling the firm
from pursuing the most profitable opportunity. This scepticism is rooted
in the belief that the costs of disengaged ownership are outweighed by the
benefits of disengaging from ownership obligations. But corporate
purpose is about creating an asset that extends beyond the brick and
mortar, or even the human capital, of the business; it is about creating and
underpinning the intangible assets that increasingly dominate the value of
tangible assets.
This is where the distinction between owners and shareholders is
critical. Shareholders can derive the benefits of intangible assets, but in so
doing they threaten their preservation. Reputations need to be nurtured and
protected from those shareholders who place a high value on the
short-term benefits of exploiting them. That is the role of engaged
owners—they have interests in promoting, protecting, and preserving the
corporation to enhance its reputational capital. That is why the apparent
attraction of being liberated from the shackles of purpose can be illusory,
and why the presence of owners who define and preserve purpose can
benefit, not undermine, disengaged shareholders. The open question is
how to promote ownership while simultaneously recognising that even
committed owners sometimes need to sell; that the ability to sell is
fundamental to share ownership; and that sometimes the threat and reality
of selling, or exiting, has an important disciplinary impact on management.
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At present, the conventional wisdom is to emphasise the shareholder as
investor, too little on the shareholder as owner.
Shareholder rights are one, and only one, means of promoting the
efficient running of the corporation as a legal structure designed to bring
together the different parties to the firm in the delivery of its corporate
purpose. The corporation should protect the interests of its minority
investors, but it also needs to protect the interests of the other
parties—creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and communities—
involved in its corporate purpose. Where the shareholder rights movement
has erred is in unbalancing the corporation by emphasising the interests of
short-term shareholders over other parties.
This is sometimes discussed in the context of what is described as
the “stakeholder” view of the firm in which the rights of parties such as
employees, suppliers, and communities are emphasised in relation to those
of shareholders.8 While this approach is correct in pointing to the
significance of other parties, it errs in the opposite direction of seeking to
confer control on employees through mutual ownership, customers in
cooperatives, or society in the form of corporatism and public ownership.
There is room for all of these, and there is merit in permitting and
promoting a plurality of corporate forms. But, this is again to miss the
point by looking only at the firm in terms of its constituent parts.
The starting point for redefining the corporation should be the
definition of corporate purpose and the promotion of it through the
participation of all relevant parties. This is achieved not simply by
conferring control on one particular group—be it minority shareholders,
employees, or customers—but by respecting their collective interest in the
delivery of corporate purpose. The achievement of corporate purpose
involves the judicious balancing of the interests of different parties and
ensuring that their incentives are aligned with those of the company as a
whole.
Key to this is the ability of companies to commit to their different
interest groups. Commenting on Colin Mayer’s book,9 Financial Times
economics columnist, Martin Wolf, further develops the argument:
Moreover, it is often in the interests of all parties to bind themselves
not to behave in such a way. But, with an active market in corporate
control, such commitments cannot be made. Those who make the
promises may disappear before they can deliver. . . . Long-term
commitments could in theory be managed instead by trying to specify
8. R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions, 4 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 409, 417 (1994).
9. COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO
RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013).
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every eventuality. About a second’s thought makes it clear that this
is impossible. It would not just be inconceivably complex and costly.
It would come up against the deeper problem of uncertainty. We have
little idea of what might happen in the next few months, let alone the
next few decades. If people are to make long-term commitments, trust
is the only alternative. But a company whose goal is whatever seems
profitable today can be trusted only to renege on implicit contracts. It
is sure to act opportunistically. If its managers did not want to do so,
they would be replaced. This is because, as Prof Mayer argues: “The
corporation is a rent extraction vehicle for the shortest-term
shareholders.” Aligning managerial rewards to shareholder returns
reinforces the opportunism.10

This concept of commitment shifts the view of the corporation from
a top down instrument of its shareholders to an entity in its own right
designed to fulfill its corporate purpose through integrating the interests of
its constituent parts as a whole. Shareholders are one, and only one, part
of that entity, and shareholder returns are one, and only one, measure of
its success. Integration requires a corporate culture that is conducive to a
unified pursuit of purpose.
III. CORPORATE CULTURE
The importance of corporate culture in unifying the pursuit of
purpose has been documented in extensive case studies of companies such
as First Chicago, Hewlett-Packard, ICI, Nissan, and Xerox.11 Jillian
Popadak explores how a company’s strategic decision making is affected
by interventions from shareholders by exploring what happens when there
are close votes on resolutions at shareholder meetings.12 She contrasts
companies where propositions just go through with those where they fail.
Even though the firms are in other respects identical, Popadak documents
significant differences in the subsequent evolution of their culture and
performance after the votes.
Popadak reports that in companies where the propositions go
through, there are:
[S]tatistically significant increases in results-orientation and
statistically significant decreases in customer-orientation, integrity,
and collaboration. This suggests that following an increase in
shareholder governance, managers implement processes which lead
10. Martin Wolf, Opportunist Shareholders Must Embrace Commitment, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26,
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/6aa87b9a-2d05-11e4-911b-00144feabdc0.
11. JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE 58–67,
107–40 (2011).
12. See generally Jillian A. Popadak, A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder
Governance Reduces Firm Value (Mar. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript).
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employees to believe that performance and achievement are the
appropriate response to unforeseen contingencies even if this
involves sacrificing honesty, ethics, and teamwork.13

Popadak finds that, in the short term, the results orientation brings
financial gains, but these are quickly reversed (see Figure 2 below):14
Specifically, in the year of the change in corporate culture, increases
in sales, profitability, and payout occur. Yet, in the long term, which
is defined as up to five years after the increase in governance,
decreases in both intangible assets and customer satisfaction along
with increases in goodwill impairment occur. By the end of the third
year, the tangible gains in sales and profitability erode and the
intangible losses dominate. 15

Short-term financial gains are therefore pursued even if they
undermine the firm’s long-term best interest.

13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 4–8.
15. Id. at 4.
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Figure 2: Market-adjusted Returns Following an Increase in
Shareholder Governance and Change in Corporate Culture
Market-Adjusted Returns
Discontinuity Sample: Increase in Shareholder Governance
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return
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Figure 2 shows abnormal equity returns—the difference between
actual and expected returns—following an increase in governance around
shareholder priorities. The first chart employs a “regression discontinuity
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approach” for a sample of S&P firms in which governance-related
proposals were brought to a vote between 2005 and 2011 and fell within
10% of the passing threshold; the second chart employs an instrumental
variable approach for a larger sample of firms over the same period. The
central line represents the relative cumulative average abnormal returns;
the upper and lower lines represent the upper and lower 95% confidence
intervals from a test of the difference between the increase in shareholder
governance and non-increase in shareholder governance firms.16
One example of where this happened was to Sears Holdings in 2005
when hedge fund billionaire Eddie Lampert acquired a large position in
the company. In the first year after the acquisition, Sears’ share price
outperformed the market by 18%. Two years later, the shares had sunk
45%, and sales retreated to pre-Lampert levels.17 In Britain, an analogous
example is British Home Stores’ decline and fall under Sir Philip Green’s
direction.18 Similarly, ICI’s precipitate demise had parallel roots. In 1987,
it declared that its purpose was:
[T]o be the world’s leading chemical company, servicing customers
internationally through the innovative and responsible application of
chemistry and related science. . . . Through achievement of our aim
we will enhance the wealth and well-being of our shareholders, our
employees, our customers and the communities which we serve and
in which we operate.19

By 1994, its purpose had been redefined as “our objective is to
maximise value for our shareholders by focusing on businesses where we
have market leadership, a technological edge and a world competitive cost
base.”20 The company made an overt change in its stated priorities in
response to a large shareholder, Hanson Trust, building a significant
holding to address the unevenness of performance reflecting its
antecedents as a merged entity. In ICI’s case, the intervention was to lead
to the breakup of the company, with one part merging to form the
pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca and the other being taken over by
AKZO.

16. This permits causal inferences by finding an instrument (i.e., variation in portfolio
diversification), which is correlated with the explanatory variable of interest (i.e., shareholder
primacy), but is uncorrelated with the outcome of interest (i.e., corporate culture or other omitted
variables). The assumption is that investors with less diversified portfolios apply more active
governance and only affect corporate culture through this channel.
17. Supra note 12, at 3.
18. Jonathan Ford, BHS: A Dealmaker’s Debacle, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/08ce87aa-0ded-11e6-ad80-67655613c2d6.
19. JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: THE REAL BUSINESS OF FINANCE 47 (2015).
20. Id. at 19.
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This is not to suggest in any way that the effects of stronger
shareholder rights or governance are necessarily detrimental. For example,
Vincente Cuñat, Mireia Gine, and Maria Guadalupe find that votes
narrowly cast in shareholder meetings in favour of propositions that
remove anti-takeover provisions yield significant positive returns to
shareholders.21 These gains are associated with falls in company
acquisitions and capital expenditures, which the authors interpret as
suggesting that increasing managerial discipline discourages valuediminishing investments. However, Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe’s results
are also consistent with managerial autonomy being conducive to greater
corporate investment. No doubt there are firms with such a poor focus on
results—engaging in value destroying investments with few intangible
assets—that increased shareholder governance has enduring payoffs for
them. However, there are others for which excessive shareholder pressure
has adverse effects on their corporate culture and long-term value creation.
IV. IMPLEMENTING ENTREPRENEURS’ VISION
Another function served by the firm is to enable the implementation
of what Goshen and Hamdani describe as “idiosyncratic visions.”22 These
are ideas based on visions of the founders and entrepreneurs that are
difficult to communicate to outside investors. Well-informed, long-term
owners can be highly beneficial.23 However, placing control in the hands
of uninformed investors may threaten the adoption of visionary
innovations that are valuable to the company in the long-term. Instead,
investors might in some circumstances be better off binding themselves to
the mast of the entrepreneur and standing by their initial judgements.
Goshen and Hamdani illustrate this in the case of Henry Ford:
Ford did not invent the automobile, nor did he own any valuable
intellectual property in the technology. He was competing with
hundreds of other entrepreneurs attempting to create a “horseless
carriage.” Ford, however, had a unique vision regarding car
production. The Detroit Automobile Company, the first firm that he
founded, was controlled by investors. While investors demanded that
21. Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate
Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943, 1969–70 (2012) (this study uses a regression
discontinuity design).
22. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Value, 125 YALE L.J.
560, 565–66 (2016).
23. Where management’s idiosyncratic value is sufficiently large, it may simply launch a
management buyout, with management owning control and cash-flow rights and investors providing
debt. See Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value,
24 J. FIN. ECON. 217–54 (1989). (This is an example of how a large informed shareholder can be
beneficial.).
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cars be immediately produced and sold, Ford insisted on perfecting
the design prior to production, leading to delays and frustration on
both sides. The tension eventually led investors to shut down the firm.
Ford’s second attempt, the Henry Ford Company, was also controlled
by investors. Again, after designing a car, Ford resisted the investors’
pressure to move directly into production. Ultimately, Ford’s
obstinacy prompted investors to replace him with Henry Leland, who
changed the company’s name to the Cadillac Automobile Company
and successfully produced the car that Ford had designed. In Ford’s
third attempt—the Ford Motor Company—he insisted on retaining
control. This time, with no outside-investor interference, Ford
transformed his innovative ideas for car design and production [his
idiosyncratic value] into one of the greatest corporate success stories
of all time. . . .
. . . Finally, with yet another move along the spectrum of ownership
structures, Ford’s grandson, Henry II, took the corporation public in
1956 with a dual-class share structure, ensuring that control stayed
with the Ford family to this day.24

V. THE CAPABILITY TO COMMIT
In both the case of a unified purpose and common culture and the
promotion of idiosyncratic ideas, companies need to be able to commit to
what, in the short-term, may appear to be value diminishing but are, in the
long-run, value enhancing policies. A variety of mechanisms exist that
allow companies to do this. While the U.K. and the U.S. are frequently
categorised together as Anglo-American systems—in order to contrast
them with those of Continental Europe and Asia—the differences between
the two countries are as great as their similarities. The U.S. has numerous
commitment mechanisms: dual-class share structures, staggered boards,
and “poison pill” defences against contested takeovers, which do not exist
in the U.K.
Whether these commitment devices achieve what they purport to do
is ultimately an empirical question. Much of the evidence is highly
sceptical. As an example, one popular approach in the U.S. is the use of
antitakeover statutes. To identify causal effects, empirical studies exploit
a natural experiment—the passage of state-level business combination
(BC) statutes that increase a firm’s protection from unsought takeover bids
by providing for the implementation of antitakeover devices.25 Because

24. Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 22, at 566–67, 567 n.22.
25. These statutes impose a moratorium (3–5 years) on large asset sales and mergers between a
large shareholder and the firm after the shareholder’s stake passes a predetermined threshold. For
robustness, these studies also examine other aspects of this legislation, including fair price and control
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firm specific considerations tend to drive the choice of governance
arrangements, this addresses the concern that other factors or
characteristics may influence or be correlated with the business outcome
under examination.26 By contrast, because legislative changes are outside
the control of individual firms and are passed in the state of incorporation
rather than the state of location, which could be influenced by local
economic conditions, they provide a precise identification of the effects of
takeover protections in relation to firms that are not covered by them.
With few exceptions, these studies have cast doubt on the
effectiveness of takeover protections. Bertrand and Mullainathan, who
pioneered this approach, find that firms incorporated in states that pass BC
statutes pay higher wages but are less likely to close down old plants or
create new ones. Their explanation is that executives, insulated from
market discipline, prefer to enjoy the “quiet life,” avoiding difficult
decisions and buying peace from the workforce, with costs for plant-level
productivity and profitability. Specifically, the introduction of
antitakeover legislation results in a roughly 0.8% drop in return on
capital.27
A second example is staggered boards. The battle over staggered
boards, in which the composition of boards can only be changed gradually
over an extended period of time, has assumed particular significance.
Staggered boards have been high on the agenda of shareholder rights
activists and corporate governance rating agencies.28 As a result, the
proportion of S&P 500 companies with staggered boards has fallen from
60% in 2000 to only 12% in 2013, leading Leo Strine, the Chief Justice of

share acquisition statutes, though business combination statutes are viewed as providing the strongest
protection.
26. For general evidence that firm specific considerations drive the choice of governance
arrangements, see generally Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The
Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 58 (2010).
27. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance
and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1070 (2003). Another study reporting similar
results is Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive
Industries?, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 312 (2010). They find operating performance as measured by ROA drop,
especially in noncompetitive industries. Id. at 316–17; see also Julian Atanassov, Do Hostile
Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting, 68 J.
FIN. 1097 (2013). It finds that innovation activity, as measured by patents and patent citations, decrease
by 11% and 16% respectively, though this effect is virtually eliminated by the presence of a
blockholder, notably oversight from public pension funds. Id. at 1110. For an overview of this
literature, see Jonathan M. Karpoff & Michael D. Wittry, Institutional and Legal Context in Natural
Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws 54 app. tbl. A1 (May 10, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript).
28. In the last decade, shareholder proposals to de-stagger have outnumbered any other
shareholder proposal submitted at U.S. companies.
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the Delaware Supreme Court, to remark that staggered boards have
become an endangered species.29
Findings from cross-sectional studies have largely validated this
collective drive, presenting staggered boards as harmful to firm value. One
study finds staggered boards reduce Tobin’s Q—a measure of firm
value—by 3%–4%, with effects stronger for staggered boards established
in the corporate charter than those established by the company’s bylaws,
which cannot be amended by shareholders.30
However, the above-mentioned studies have been challenged.
Karpoff and Wittry (2015) and Catan and Kahan (2016) show that
focusing solely on BC statutes at the expense of wider institutional,
political economy and historical conditions can lead to bias and even
reverse interpretations.31 They find that for a range of firm outcomes
examined in prior studies, the effect of BC statutes becomes insignificant
once controls are added.32 Likewise, in regard to staggered boards,
Cremers, Litov, and Sepe33 find that, cross-sectionally, firms with
staggered boards have lower firm value in line with previous research.
However, when they use time-series analysis, they find that staggered
boards are positively related to firm value. On average, adoption of a
staggered board is associated with an increase in firm value of 6.9%.34

29. Strine, supra note 4, at 497.
30. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409,
428 (2005); see also Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment,
83 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 506–07 (2007).
31. Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68
STAN. L. REV. 629, 661–65 (2016); Karpoff & Wittry, supra note 27, at 8. For the use of regulatory
and legal changes as a natural experiment, see Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Unnatural Experiments?
Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies, 110 ECON J. 672, 689–92 (2000); Timothy Werner
& John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent Expenditures, and Agency Costs: Reexamining the
Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 136–44 (2015).
32. In replications, poison pills are found to be economically and statistically significant, which
chimes with the importance attached to them by legal scholars. See, e.g., Karpoff & Wittry, supra note
27, at 9–11.
33. See K. J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and
Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited (May 22, 2016) (unpublished manuscript); K.J. Martijn Cremers &
Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016)
[hereinafter Cremers & Sepe, Shareholder Value]. Time series analysis can control for firm
characteristics that do not change over time; as such, it is better equipped to isolate what change in
firm value within the same firm occurred before or after the adoption of a staggered board, and thus
rule out reverse causality which is found to drive cross-sectional results.
34. In establishing this association, the authors rule out a number of alternative explanations:
they find no evidence that the valuation effects of adopting a staggered board are driven by
expectations of future takeover activity that often produce substantial premia for the target’s
shareholders. Nor do they find that the adoption is accompanied by other changes in firm governance
that toughen safeguards against managerial entrenchment—and so amply compensate shareholders for
the costs of staggered boards. Cremers & Sepe, Shareholder Value, supra note 33, at 102–03.
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This is an advance on the identification methods of previous
staggered board studies, though it still falls short of direct causality. A
study by Cohen and Wang provides stronger inferences in this regard.35 It
investigates two Delaware court decisions in the Airgas case, which had
diverging impacts on companies with staggered boards, depending on the
random timing of a company’s annual meeting. Measuring announcement
returns after these two rulings, the authors find evidence consistent with
the view that staggered boards reduce stock price, albeit not at
conventional levels of significance.36
All this suggests caution should be applied when evaluating evidence
on antitakeover statutes and staggered boards. Most significantly of all,
they suggest that treating firms as homogenous entities may miss
interesting patterns at a granular level. For instance, Johnson, Karpoff, and
Yi report that initial public offering companies (IPOs) employ more
takeover defences, such as staggered boards, when they have important
business partnerships—large customers, dependent suppliers, or strategic
alliance partners—to protect.37 In the absence of such defences, those
partnerships could be threatened by possible takeovers of the IPO firms.
Consistent with this, they find a positive association between these
defences and subsequent valuation and operating performance.38 Others
35. Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value?
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2013). For a study that sheds light on
causality via RD and IV techniques but finds that adopting antitakeover provisions increases
shareholder value by approximately 3%, see Erin E. Smith, Do Shareholders Want Less Governance?
Evidence from the Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions 4 (Mar. 19, 2015) (unpublished manuscript).
36. Cohen & Wang, supra note 35, at 633–40. The quasi-experimental design employed by this
study has many appealing features, though it leaves a number of unanswered questions. First, as with
all event studies that focus on short-term market reactions, it says little about long-term effects of
staggered boards on firm fundamentals. Second, as others have pointed out, findings appear quite
sensitive to sample selection, the removal of outliers, and the choice of different industry fixed effects.
See Yakov Amihud & Stoyan Stoyanov, Do Staggered Boards Harm Shareholders? 14 (Apr. 7, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript); see also Cremers & Sepe, Shareholder Value, supra note 33, at 96 n.144.
Third, insofar as existing Delaware law permits the use of powerful antitakeover protections such as
poison pills, it is not possible to determine whether having annual elections for directors would
generate greater shareholder value than having staggered boards but with restrictions on takeover
defences such as poison pills. Thus, it provides limited real-world guidance to firms contemplating the
adoption of a staggered board outside a takeover context where even sceptics acknowledge the
intellectual case is strongest. See Guhan Subramanian, Board Silly, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/opinion/14subramanian.html?_r=0. Finally, it speaks only to the
average effect of staggered boards; it is possible that staggered boards will have different effects for
different firms.
37. William J. Johnson, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Sangho Yi, The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover
Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 313 (2015).
38. This association continues to hold when the authors use the identity and characteristics of
the IPO company’s law firm as an instrument for takeover defences, supporting the inference that
takeover defences are a cause of, not just correlated with, higher value and performance. Id. at
320–25.
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find that these protections matter more to companies that rely on R&D and
intangibles,39 operate in opaque information environments,40 and have
higher advisory needs41—settings which are consistent with the
importance of commitment. Acquisitions financed with debt or takeovers
that result in a significant increase in market power may be especially
disruptive.42
There is also evidence that value effects depend on industry structure.
Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf draw a distinction between defences
that impose a delay on potential acquirers and ones that do not.43 They find
that delay provisions, such as staggered boards, increase bargaining power
by locking in shareholders, with effects strongest in concentrated
industries where targets are relatively scarce.44 Similarly, defences may
complement other organisational practices and features such as
management quality.45 Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi, for
instance, find that long-term incentives, combined with protection from
early failure, takeover, or both is supportive of innovation activity. 46
Finally, commitment devices need not take the form of traditional
takeover protections. Flammer and Kacperczyk report the impact of
state-level constituency statutes on innovation.47 Under these statutes, a
corporation’s directors are permitted to incorporate a wide range of
stakeholder interests in their business decisions.48 The authors find that
39. Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 33, at 5; Cremers & Sepe, Shareholder Value, supra note
33, at 128.
40. Augustine Duru, Dechun Wang & Yijiang Zhao, Staggered Boards, Corporate Opacity and
Firm Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 341, 358–59 (2013).
41. Seoungpil Ahn & Keshab Shrestha, The Differential Effects of Classified Boards on Firm
Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3993, 4011 (2013).
42. Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta & Rik Sen, Discipline or Disruption? Stakeholder Relationships
and the Effect of Takeover Threat, 62 MGMT. SCI. 2820, 2823 (2015).
43. Dalida Kadyrzhanova & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Concentrating on Governance, 66 J. FIN.
1649, 1650 (2011).
44. Id. at 1651.
45. Thomas J. Chemmanur, Imants Paeglis & Karen Simonyan, Management Quality and
Anti-Takeover Provisions, 54 J.L. & ECON. 651, 653 (2011).
46. Nina Baranchuk, Robert Kieschnick & Rabih Moussawi, Motivating Innovation in Newly
Public Firms, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 578, 579 (2014). These complementary methods are consistent with
this theory. See DAVID R. SKEIE, VESTING AND CONTROL IN VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS, STAFF
REPORT NO. 297, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 23 (2007); Gustavo Manso, Motivating Innovation, 66 J.
FIN. 1823, 1824 (2011). Manso finds that the optimal incentive scheme for innovation combines
substantial tolerance, and even support for early failure, with rewards for long-term success as well as
timely feedback on performance. See id. However, this should not be viewed as providing a general
justification for tolerating managerial failure.
47. See Caroline Flammer & Aleksandra Kacperczyk, The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on
Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 62 MGMT. SCI. 1982 (2015). Note some of the
problems described in relation to antitakeover statutes apply here, e.g., the role of corporate lobbying
and political economy considerations.
48. Id. at 10.
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after enactment, the number of patents increases significantly over time so
that, after forty-eight months, the number of patents and citations increase
by more than 4%, suggesting that stakeholder orientation has an enduring
effect on innovation.49
It is important to view these claims as suggestive rather than
definitive and causal.50 The flipside of acknowledging the importance of
heterogeneous effects is that arrangements will not be appropriate in every
circumstance. There are many companies in which stakeholder interests
are adequately protected through contract or where the investments that
parties make in the firm are modest and require little protection. There are
companies that do not invest heavily in intangibles and are not pursuing
idiosyncratic visionary ideas of entrepreneurs and founders. Managers
with a small opportunity set and few available resources may have limited
scope to pursue idiosyncratic value.51 Others may suffer from tunnel vision
and overconfidence; the corporate landscape is littered with the husks of
businesses and ideas that failed because entrepreneurs dug their heels in
rather than relinquish control and accept outside input.52 In these instances,
the costs of commitment devices may greatly outweigh their benefits. As
with any complex human and commercial activity, there is a ledger of
pluses and minuses and evidence that the net effect depends on the nature
of and the context in which activities are being undertaken.
VI. BRITISH PARTICULARITIES
Identifying the circumstances in which these devices benefit
corporate purpose constitutes a more fruitful line of inquiry than simply
asking whether or not they are generically beneficial. In the U.K., policy
and precedent have foreclosed this approach. Section 172 of the Company
Act 2006 recognises the interests of parties other than just shareholders.
However, these are derivative responsibilities on directors subordinate to
those of the owners of the company; they are not primary obligations in
their own right. Their effectiveness is further circumscribed by the courts’
lack of business expertise and reluctance to second-guess the decisions or
policies of directors, save in cases of very bad behaviour or where directors

49. Id. at 17.
50. Caution may be in order because many studies rely on cross-sectional evidence which is
subject to endogeneity issues.
51. Noam Wasserman, Bharat Anand & Nitin Nohria, When Does Leadership Matter: A
Contingent Opportunities View of CEO Leadership 11–12, excerpted in HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Nitin Nohria & Rakesh Khuruna eds., 2010).
52. NOAM WASSERMAN, THE FOUNDER’S DILEMMAS: ANTICIPATING AND AVOIDING THE
PITFALLS THAT CAN SINK A STARTUP 205–16, 297–304 (2012).
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have left clear proof of their thought processes.53 This outlook, enshrined
in the business judgement rule, reflects the legal traditions of the common
law system, which approaches issues from a perspective in which the
contract predominates.54
The upshot is that U.K. directors are not liberated from the pursuit of
shareholder interests to nearly the same extent as in the U.S. In the U.S.,
variants of dual-class shares are commonplace, and some of the most
prominent companies have issued dual-class shares (see Figures 3 and 4
below). Recent examples include Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, and Under
Armour, all of which came to the stock market with dual-class shares that
conferred substantially more voting rights on their founders than on
investors who subscribed to public issues.
Figure 3: Antitakeover Provisions and Prevalence of Dual-Class
Shares in Several Industries in the U.S.55

Industry
Anti-Takeover Provisions
Apparel
18%
Communication,
Printing, and Publishing
17%
Industrial Services
24%
Metal, Plastics, Paper,
and Packaging
34%
Average All IPOs
22%

Dual-Class Shares
10%
38%
10%
15%
5%

53. PAUL DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES: PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW 443–48 (2012).
54. P.M. Vasudev, Corporate Stakeholders in Canada: An Overview and a Proposal, 45
OTTAWA L. REV. 135, 157 (2013).
55. Laura Casares Fields, Control Considerations of Newly Public Firms: The Implementation
of Antitakeover Provisions and Dual Class Shares Before the IPO 34 (Feb. 10, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript).
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Figure 4: Examples of Dual-Class Shares in the U.S.
Google:
Class A common stock one vote per share
Class B 10 votes per share
Larry Page, Sergey Brin and Eric Schmidt 37.6% of votes; executive and directors
61.4%.
LinkedIn:
Class A common stock one vote per share
Class B 10 votes per share
Class B shareholders give to all pre-IPO investors Reid Hoffman 21.7% increasing over
time.

Evidence on the impact of dual-class shares is relatively limited,
though the most authoritative study to date, by Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2010), found that companies with dual-class shares are more
likely to have agency problems than those with a single share class. Firm
value is negatively associated with the wedge between insiders’ cash flow
rights and voting rights, which is large enough in many cases to provide
insiders with a majority of the votes despite their claims to only a minority
of the economic value.56 However, this work is far from the final say;
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s own results are quite sensitive to sample
selection and estimation methods used to address endogeneity concerns.57
More importantly, the effectiveness of dual-class shares, like other
commitment devices, hinges on the details. There is growing attention to
the ways in which dual-class shares and other commitment devices are
designed to deliver their purported benefits without giving rise to abuse or
unintended consequences. These include the use of sunset clauses and
conditionalities; vote caps; minimum equity thresholds held by insiders;
open eligibility criteria; basic voting rights for common shares; and a
myriad of other features related to a company’s governance.58 This type of
56. Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of
Dual-Class Companies in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1052 (2010).
57. In instrumental variable regressions, point estimates are similar, but significance levels are
much lower. Results are strongest for a particular subset of dual class firms—ones with voting control,
but less than 50% of the cash-flow rights, representing around 35%–40% of the dual class universe.
Id. at 1084–85.
58. For statements of good practice, see DUAL CLASS SHARE POLICY, CANADIAN COALITION
FOR
GOOD
GOVERNANCE
(Sept.
2013),
http://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/
dual_class_share_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RB3-WAY3]. See also CONSULTATION CONCLUSION
TO CONCEPT PAPER ON WEIGHTED VOTING RIGHTS, H.K. EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD. (June 2015),
https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082cc.pdf
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fine variation rarely shows up in the data and leaves open the possibility
that intermediate or hybrid structures may be more beneficial for corporate
performance.
An important recent development, in this respect, is the principle of
proxy access. Shareholders in a number of U.S. companies, such as Apple,
are being granted the right to put forward nominations to their board of
directors in their annual proxy statements if they, or a group of (for
example up to twenty) shareholders, have held more than a certain fraction
of shares (e.g., 3%) for a particular period of time (e.g., three years).59 It
thereby confers greater rights on blocks of shares held for long periods
rather than on just company founders and other insiders. This practice is
similar to principles such as the Loi Florange in France, by which
shareholders who have held their shares for more than two years
automatically have the right to double voting rights unless the company
specifically opts not to apply this.60 Italy has a similar law.61
U.K. rules do not allow what are termed “premium-listed companies”
to issue any form of dual-class shares that confer differential voting rights
on different classes of shareholders. British regulatory authorities, along
with institutional investors, believe that dual-class shares, however
designed, discriminate against minority shareholders who have fewer
voting rights per share.62 They are, therefore, regarded as a violation of
minority investor protection and equality of treatment of shareholders.63 A
second contrasting example is the powerful limit on the use of the
staggered board. It is a mandatory rule of U.K. company law that
shareholders can remove directors at any time by an ordinary resolution.
A meeting to vote on such a resolution can be requisitioned by only 5% of
the company’s voting shares.64

[https://perma.cc/7T9Y-8ZSN]. The exchange gave up on dual-class shares after the Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) rejected it.
59. See, e.g., Tim Bradshaw & Stephen Foley, Apple Opens Board Nominations to Large
Investors, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/f52529a8-a905-11e5-955c1e1d6de94879.
60. See Analysis: Differentiated Voting Rights in Europe, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS
SERVS.,
INC.,
https://www.issgovernance.com/analysis-differentiated-voting-rights-in-europe/
[https://perma.cc/G8LK-2U38].
61. Id.
62. There are two designations of listing on the London Stock Exchange premium (formerly
known as primary) and standard (formerly termed secondary). Premium-listed companies are not
permitted to issue dual class shares.
63. G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58–89,
82–83 (1996).
64. See, e.g., Removal of a Director from Office, CO. LAW CLUB, http://www.companylawclub.
co.uk/removal-of-a-director-from-office [https://perma.cc/P7EQ-7RA6]; Companies Act, 2006, c. 46
§ 303(2) (Eng.).
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The contrast extends to the rules regarding the use of takeover
defences by target firms of hostile acquisitions. U.S. law allows companies
to create blocking positions in the event of a hostile takeover by issuing
new shares to existing shareholders but excluding those held by the
acquirer.65 This poison pill defence dilutes the shares held by the acquirer
making it prohibitively expensive for the acquirer to proceed with a bid.
The target management is thus empowered to use its business judgement
in determining whether an acquisition is in the best interests of
shareholders as owners, or fails to reward them adequately for their shares
should the takeover go ahead. The case against poison pills is that they can
allow managements to entrench themselves, protect their own interests, or
both. In this territory, there are very few, if any, initiatives that do not have
some downsides to offset the potential upsides.
The U.K. Takeover Code, which defines the rules by which takeovers
are conducted, has been strengthened in the wake of Kraft’s takeover of
Cadbury.66 Put-up-or-shut-up requirements, greater recognition of
employee interests, improved transparency of bidders’s plans, and
increased clarity over post-offer commitments have put the interests of
long-term investors and stakeholders on a more solid footing. However,
these changes are still seen as a halfway house and are unlikely to alter the
incentives or behaviour of a bidder who is intent on parking its tanks on
the target company’s lawn.67
Moreover, takeover regulation has long leaned against the American
view, stipulating that a target of an acquisition cannot adopt poison pills
once a takeover bid has been initiated. Management is not granted similar
discretion, the reason being that poison pills are regarded as a way of
frustrating value-enhancing bids against the interests of minority
shareholders. This particular concern is not without justification, though it
is emblematic of the general way in which U.K. regulations restrict the
ability of founders to retain control of companies after they are listed on
stock markets and limit management’s freedom to defend themselves
against hostile acquisitions. It has thereby contributed significantly to the
dispersed nature of ownership of its listed companies and to the unusually
high level of exposure of companies to hostile takeovers. Between 1991
and 2005, hostile takeovers in Britain enjoyed a 61% success rate—far

65. See generally Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation, http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu (tag: poison pills). See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354–55 (Del. 1985)
66. See Ben Morris, The Cadbury Deal: How It Changed Takeovers, BBC (May 2, 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27258143 [https://perma.cc/N3TU-PM89].
67. Thanks to Mark Seligman for his commentary on the nature and impact of post-Cadbury
Takeover Code.
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higher than elsewhere.68 Nor have successive U.K. governments chosen to
offset the bias, declaring that only in exceptional cases are they prepared
to contest ‘market’ judgements.69
The biases in Britain cumulatively lean against corporate purpose.
Limitations on dual-class shares, staggered boards, and anti-takeover
devices are viewed as important forms of minority investor protection,
with founders and managers not afforded the discretion the U.S. confers
on them to adopt what they regard as appropriate ownership structures.
Notwithstanding its imperfections, what marks out the U.S., and is a
significant source of its corporate success, is its diversity and promotion
of a variety of forms of ownership and control. The U.K. promotes a much
more uniform and shareholder-oriented system that has restricted the way
in which firms can structure their operations. There may be considerable
advantages to promoting and celebrating corporate diversity and
facilitating it through enabling permissive regulation and legislation.
However, it is not advantageous to prescribe what a particular school of
thought dictates as being the right way of structuring firms. To the extent
purpose matters, this bias needs redressing.
CONCLUSION
Companies were originally established to embody purpose, and for
good reason. Markets cannot substitute for organisations with purpose.
They are complementary, not substitutes. For companies to be able to
deliver on purpose, they need to be able to commit to it and establish the
internal cultures that are consistent with it. Shareholder primacy has made
clear where the power of organisations ultimately lies. It is not with CEOs,
chairmen, or board directors. These are agents; they are not the principals.
Whatever the good intention of the management, however compelling the
purpose statements of companies, if the shareholders are not committed to
them, they are of little significance.
In some cases, this is justified by the need to align management with
shareholder interests. In others, management needs to be able to stand back
and take a more balanced view of what is in the corporate interest as a
whole. They need to be able to commit to the community of interests in
the firm, including those promoting idiosyncratic ideas that are the source

68. Jonathan Ford, A New Approach to British Deal Making is Required, FIN. TIMES (June 11,
2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a8a12a6-f14c-11e3-9fb0-00144feabdc0.html.
69. Recently the U.K. Government has raised questions about the merits of in particular foreign
takeovers. For a comprehensive description of the U.K. Government position on takeovers, see
generally Antony Seely, Mergers and Takeovers: The Public Interest (Briefing Paper No. 5374),
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR. (2016).
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of corporate innovation and value creation in the long-run. This may
involve constraining the power of shareholders.
This is not to suggest that shareholder rights should be diminished in
all circumstances, but that companies should have greater latitude in
determining what is suited to their particular activities. Diversity should
be welcomed and encouraged through regulation that is enabling and
permissive rather than prescriptive and restrictive. The U.K. has not been
wrong to strengthen shareholder rights, but it has erred in seeking its
uniform adoption.

